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seen by egalitarians not as a hitherto unrecognized affirmation of 
libertarian values, but as a way to "liberate" women from childbirth 
and motherhood. We will have to wait and see whether the conse-
quent devaluation of the unique female biological role has liberated 
women or set them adrift. But in any case that is the way the issue 
of abortion has evolved in the United States during the last third of 
the twentieth century. Feminists and their juristic allies who appeal 
to a woman's right to her own body do not characteristically base 
this appeal on the killing/letting die distinction; they seem willing 
to allow that abortion is killing, but hold that the woman's right to 
her own body justifies it. Admirable as is Wennberg's philosophical 
craftsmanship, and accurate as is his pinpointing of the conceptual 
abortion issue as fetal right to life versus libertarian values, the pith 
of the abortion debate actually raging today is the fetal right to life 
versus certain notions of sexual equality. 
THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DE-
MOCRACY. By John Agresto.1 Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 1984. Pp. 167. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $7.95. 
David E. Engdahfz 
In small compass, this book sets new bearings for exploration 
of the judicial role in a polity at once claiming democratic postu-
lates and constitutional restraints. The author finds defective both 
in theory and in consequence not only the thesis of judicial 
supremacy over constitutional doctrine, but also the counteractive 
thesis that popular opinion or democratic actions should control the 
constitutional opinions of courts. Dr. Agresta endorses judicial in-
dependence-including a vigorous independence in exercising the 
function of judicial review; yet judicial supremacy troubles him as 
much as attempts to restrain the judiciary. 
It seems not quite accurate to call his "a middle path" -even 
though Agresta himself uses that metaphor. That expression con-
notes compromise in quest of repose, accommodating divergent 
views. Rather than repose, Dr. Agresta points a course of continu-
ing, creative conflict. "What is needed," he suggests, 
is a way ... to keep democracy, constitutionalism, and judicial review in a support-
ive and complementary relationship to one another; that is, to keep the tension in 
balance, not to resolve it. ... 
I. Acting Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities. 
2. Professor, University of Puget Sound School of Law. 
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[T]he mere genius of the American constitutional system is not merely the 
separation of functions but their interactions, their debates, their perennial clashes. 
What is needed is a defense of the principle of judicial review within a system 
of reciprocal checks. It must be a position that recognizes and encourages the exer-
cise of judicial review. But it must also be a position that understands the tenuous 
connection between judicial review and republican government. Moreover, it must 
be a position that understands the potential dangers to a constitutional republic-
that is, government that is both principled and limited-arising from a corps of 
permanent judges working under notions of independence equivalent to judicial au-
tonomy and judicial finality. 
Sharing the opinion of many that over the past thirty years (more or 
less) the nation has acquiesced restlessly in a kind of "judicial im-
peralism," exhibited perhaps most presumptuously in Cooper v. 
Aaron,3 Agresto expresses the hope: 
that, if a reaction to judicial supremacy ultimately does occur, it will not be carried 
out against the principle of judicial review or against the Court as an institution, but 
rather will take the form of restoring the Court to its proper place in a system of 
checked and balanced powers. 
Dr. Agresto begins by inquiring why we should countenance 
the practice of judicial review. It is no answer that the framers in-
tended it; other things intended but later judged dysfunctional have 
been changed. To those who contend that judicial review is the ulti-
mate safeguard for individual rights, Agresto points out the readily 
documented4 but too easily forgotten fact that, historically, the 
Supreme Court more frequently has restricted such rights and re-
stricted liberal legislation. s Suggestions that judicial review is of 
value (at least with respect to national legislation) for sobering legis-
lative judgment "are more elegant," Agresto observes, "in theory 
than in actual practice . . . . If the argument contained in such 
scholarship is to be believed, the Court's function seems to be to 
take national legislation (which is itself often too little too late), pre-
vent its effectuation for some time, and then relent." 
Moreover, declares Agresto, when judicial activism is contro-
versial less for blocking legislative initiatives than for the shaping of 
social policy without benefit of initiative from any elected branch, 
such justifications are insufficient. 
Yet, while he rejects the arguments commonly made in its de-
3. "[T]he interpretation ... enunciated by this Court ... is the supreme law of the 
land .... " Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I, 18 (1958). See also id. at 23-24 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
4. See, e.g., Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1205 (1983), and The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 
(1981). 
5. "The modem defense of judicial power which sees the Court as, by its nature, a 
liberal institution and the protector of minorities from oppressive majorities requires of us too 
much historical and philosophical forgetting." 
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fense, Agresto is a champion of judicial review. What distinguishes 
him from others who have written on judicial review and democ-
racy is that he makes no pretense of reconciling the two. Instead he 
underscores their inherent conflict, rejects any assertion that de-
mocracy can or should be safeguarded in the conflict by judicial 
"self-restraint,"6 and suggests serious resort to the "seemingly ba-
roque" scheme of checks and balances. 
In terms of political theory, Agresto observes: 
The underlying promise of judicial review is that with it we may bring our philoso-
phy, our principles, to bear on our actions, and thus work out our present and our 
future in terms of our inheritance from the past. 
[T]he great promise of judicial review is that with it we may rise to the level of our 
highest aspirations and live, politically, a principled life. 
Judicial review, he maintains, operates "as the legal check on politi-
cal excess and as the mediator of our principles"; but its more im-
portant function is the second of these two. The former function, in 
a democracy, could have been served by more frequent elections or 
shorter terms of office; it is the latter function-principled media-
tion of democracy itself-that requires something more. 
Agresto devotes much of his final chapter to expounding the 
advantages of an "active" Supreme Court, engaged in constitutional 
decisionmaking without contrived self-restraint. Not forgetting 
that historically the Court has acted as a barrier "to almost all na-
tional attempts to expand the meaning and scope of liberty in this 
country," he notes that more recently it has turned actively to en-
larging constitutional rights. While warning of danger if this new 
kind of activism should remain effectively unchecked, Agresto en-
dorses it as the Court's grandest role: 
The primary defense . . . of the power of judicial review under the Constitution is 
the possibility of using that power as a guide to the democracy in its desire to live a 
principled life, a life in accord with certain formative national ideals .... [I]t is here, 
in the sheltering and nourishing of ideals and principles and in the guidance of 
choice, that the supreme role of the Court is to be found. 
6. As Agresto puts it: 
The demand for self-restraint is usually ineffectual when addressed to most holders 
of political power. It may be especially fruitless when those holders of power can 
also see themselves as possessing special insight into constitutional mandates and 
constitutional right. In addition, the partisans of judicial self-restraint, who are 
generally perceptive students of the constitutional foundations of American political 
institutions, should find the idea of self-restraint an anomaly in a system purposely 
built on layers of external restraints. The genius that animinated all of our politics 
was that each and every institution (not to mention every faction and individual) 
could be freed-allowed to be active-because each would be balanced and checked. 
To be active without a check is tyranny; but a self-generated check on activity may 
well undermine the possibility of great contributions. 
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[I]t is part of the nature of the human species that we necessarily seek "to work out 
the implications" of our beliefs . 
. . . The greatest role of the Court is neither to revise our fundamental beliefs 
nor merely to apply those beliefs to new occurrences. At its peak the Court will be 
that part of American politics which more than any other struggles to work out the 
implications of our beliefs. More than any other branch the Court explains to us 
the living mute words of the Constitution as the Constitution's principles of equal 
liberty grow in self-understanding . 
. . . Here, in the reasoning out of our public philosophy, of articulating the still 
shadowy images of our thoughts, is the final justification for judicial review. 
Thus Agresto marks himself off both from those who would confine 
the Constitution to its framers' intent or understanding and from 
those who would say it is a "living" document malleable to meet 
changing perceived needs. His ideal is a Supreme Court operating 
actively as the nation's "institutionalized theoretician," grappling 
with and explicating our deepest political thoughts, elucidating and 
nourishing our national ideals-but doing so within a scheme of 
effective democratic checks. 
As to the historical emergence of judicial review, Agresto notes 
that the existence of a few, well-published precedents explain the 
evident expectation of most members of the Constitutional Conven-
tion that judges should assess independently the constitutionality of 
government acts, and also explain the Federalist's allusions to the 
practice with no perceived need for theoretical justification. The 
Supreme Court's later exercise of that function in Marbury v. 
Madison, therefore, Agresto finds quite unremarkable in itself. 
What he does find remarkable, however, is that Chief Justice 
Marshall used neither of the arguments Agresto deems strongest to 
justify judicial review. The stronger arguments, Agresto suggests, 
might have been eschewed precisely because, while establishing the 
principle of independent judicial review, they "might also have ad-
mitted other ideas as well''-in particular, "checks" on the judicial 
review function of the Court: "Clearly, what Marshall needed was 
not the best arguments that would allow the Court judicial review, 
but arguments that would set off the Court as, in Marshall's words, 
the especial, the emphatic interpreter of the organic law, the inter-
preter capable of binding all states and all branches." 
Thus Agresto attributes to Marshall a strategic decision to em-
ploy a purely formal "ontological proof for the existence of judicial 
review-judges say what the law is, the Constitution is law, there-
fore judges must say what the Constitution is .... " The "obvious 
effect" of this syllogism, he argues, "is that, in matters of constitu-
tional interpretation, Congress is bound and the Court is the body 
empowered to bind"; and with this "we find ourselves perilously 
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close to a simple acceptance not merely of judicial review but of 
ultimate judicial supremacy .... " For: 
[i]f, following Marshall, we base our understanding and defense of judicial review 
on the idea that "the Constitution is law," then the primacy of the Court in the 
American system of governance becomes more set. But if our basic view of the 
Constitution begins not with what the Constitution is-law-but with what it estab· 
Iished-a constitutional democracy of separated powers, checked and balanced-
then the activity of judicial review becomes part of an interlocking totality of gov-
ernance. In other words, the idea of the Constitution as law interpreted by judges 
and the idea of the Constitution as a framework for limited government may well 
lead to different results. 
Although Agresto believes it to be "relatively clear" that judi-
cial review was intended by the framers, it seems to him obvious 
that: 
if the Founders had thought that the power of judicial review might later be used as 
the bulwark of privilege against private rights, or that it might weaken-or even 
unduly work to strengthen-national political power as against local rights, or that 
it would someday involve the active promulgation of governmental activity rather 
than merely the checking of questionable legislation, we then could have expected 
greater clarity from the Founders and a more extensive debate in the convention. 
But such notions never arose. And so discussion of the limits of judicial review, or 
of the proper restraints on judicial independence, or of the optimal relationship of 
judicial power to the democratic will never surfaced. 
Thus the relative silence of the Convention on the point is attrib-
uted to failure to anticipate the uses to which the presumed review 
prerogative eventually might be put. 
In contrast, however, the equal silence in Marbury as to "effec-
tive and practical checks on the Court" Agresto attributes to "the 
brilliance (if we may call it that) of Marshall's analysis .... " 
Agresto stops just short of endorsing the conventional view that ju-
dicial supremacy (as distinguished from independence in reviewing 
government acts brought into question in litigation) was Marshall's 
avowed thesis in Marbury. Supremacy, he says, is a "quite plausi-
ble" extrapolation from Marshall's reasoning; but Agresto seems to 
believe that Marshall himself intended the extrapolation to be 
made. 7 
7. Chief Justice Marshall in 1803 did not contemplate judicial supremacy at all. A 
maverick in his Federalist party, unlike two of his fellow Justices he never had endorsed that 
High Federalist view. On the contrary his view (which he expressed earlier in Congress) was 
one of interdepartmental independence without any preeminent authority-essentially the 
same as Jefferson's at the time. (Only much later did Jefferson espouse congressional 
supremacy, although some of his partisans had done so as early as 1802). Furthermore, the 
folklore image of Marshall as masterful strategist enhancing the power of the judiciary by 
craft does not correspond to historical fact. He had too much integrity, humility, and candor 
for that. Only later, when unequivocal authority at the center seemed essential to counter 
increasingly centrifugal political forces, did his younger associate and friend Joseph Story 
apparently swing Marshall toward the supremacist view. One cannot understand correctly 
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As the years passed after Marbury the judicial supremacy the-
sis did come to enjoy rather general acceptance--despite several 
contrary views successively propounded by Jefferson, which 
Agresto calls " a compendium of all of the various radical alterna-
tives to judicial review." At least by 1830, judicial supremacy had 
taken on "all the aspects of constitutional orthodoxy." As Agresto 
points out, it survived even Jackson's rhetoric largely because, "[i]n 
a nation deeply troubled by regional and sectional conflicts," the 
idea of a single authoritative expositor of the Constitution within 
the central government itself not only "seemed rather favorable to 
the forces of American nationalism" but also "seemed (at least in 
theory) to take the most explosive issues of the day out ofthe electo-
ral arena and settle them more objectively" by means of judges "en-
dowed by popular myth with the attributes of dispassion and 
disinterest. ... " 
What was overlooked as the judicial supremacy thesis attained 
general acceptance, Agresto notes, is that it-no less than the thesis 
of congressional supremacy (to which Jefferson ultimately was 
driven)-"suffer[s] from the defect of oversimplification ... ," over-
coming "the tension between constitutionalism and democracy by 
blinding us to the historic and proper reasons behind that tension." 
For a time the danger of this oversimplification was not apparent; 
but the blinders were removed by Dred Scott. 
"The oddest aspect of those parts of the Lincoln-Douglas de-
bates concerning the nature of the Constitution," Agresto observes, 
"is that our popular contemporary ideas of judicial review are al-
ways expressed by Douglas and never by Lincoln." "To Lincoln," 
he observes, "the status of judicial authority in a constitutional de-
mocracy was considerably more complex." Lincoln "sought to find 
ways of working within the tensions and ambiguities of American 
politics and not to resolve those tensions." Lincoln's distinction be-
tween what we lawyers call res judicata (Agresto, being a political 
scientist, does not use that term), and treating Supreme court pro-
nouncements as "political rules," is well known. So is his percep-
tion (shared with Jackson and Jefferson and many other critics) that 
"mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority .... " What 
Agresto seeks to do is to expand on Lincoln's position and, having 
that oft-quoted sentence from Marbury v. Madison about "the province and duty of the judi-
cial department" except in the context of the sentence which Marshall immediately sub-
joined, about the application of a rule "to particular cases." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803). It was independence in the function of adjudicating "cases," and by no means au-
thoritative supremacy as to constitutional "questions," which Marshall in his 1803 opinion 
espoused. 
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"endeavored to lay out the theoretical framework of the discus-
sion," to "attempt to speak somewhat more practically." 
For the most part the "attempt to speak somewhat more prac-
tically" is made in Agresto's penultimate chapter. The "usual" an-
swer given to those seeking checks on the power of judicial review-
constitutional amendment-Agresto dismisses as worse than inef-
fective. Because a fraction as small as 13.1% can block a constitu-
tional amendment, to consider amendment a check on the Court 
would be to institutionalize minority rule. But for the Civil War, he 
notes, Dred Scott could not have been overturned by amendment; 
and neither could the holdings on child labor, minimum wages, and 
government economic intervention. Moreover, "despite the wide 
and pervasive political effects a decision might have, not every polit-
ical decision should become a matter of constitutional politics." 
And in any event, amendment is deficient as a check because any 
amendment itself remains subject to final judicial interpretation; the 
Court's prompt evisceration of the Reconstruction Amendments il-
lustrates the easy frustration of this "check." 
The other often recited "checks" Agresto finds too severe, im-
possible, or both. Impeachment of course is a bugbear; "[i]n fact, 
the reason impeachment is impossible politically is in large measure 
that it seems extremely inappropriate morally." Appointment dis-
cretion is notorious for its ineffectiveness, and courtpacking is a 
strategem of dubious practical utility. Of greater practical pros-
pect-but worse in terms of political liabilities-is congressional 
manipulation of subject matter jurisdiction: Agresto rejects this 
"check," not merely because the current spate of critical literature 
about "court-stripping" makes Congress's power in this regard 
seem unclear, but more because: 
it seems to demand that consideration of the constitutional legitimacy of particular 
legislative acts be, a priori, closed in certain areas. Thus, in the very exercise of a 
power granted with seeming constitutional clarity, Congress finds itself verging on 
the very type of autonomous legislative activity that the principle of constitutional-
ism was meant to deflect. 
The checks which Agresto tenders as "effective," however, he 
takes fewer than eight pages to present. The principal one is "Con-
gress' unquestioned ability to rewrite voided legislation in order to 
pass judicial scrutiny," forcing the Court to reexamine in slightly 
different context a constitutional position previously taken. This 
modest expedient, he maintains, history shows to have been gener-
ally effective, "especially when it is buttressed by timely presidential 
appointments or sympathetic legal scholarship ... " He instances 
the experience with child labor legislation, the first and second 
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AAA, and civil rights statutes. Sometimes equivalent legislative de-
signs might be recast "in alternate constitutional guise" -an expedi-
ent he is unnecessarily ready to confess as sometimes a "ruse." At 
other times, minimal changes might be enough to surmount judicial 
objections; and there are even examples of reenactment without ma-
terial changes, "not seeking to have the Court distinguish but sim-
ply to have to relent." 
In addition, Agresta points out, "Congress also has the ability 
to circumscribe the holding of any decision in an attempt to delimit 
its effects." He instances the sundry enactments responding to the 
Supreme Court's abortion holdings. Admittedly, many of these 
might be invalidated, but each presents an opportunity for reconsid-
ering the basic holding and the whole process amounts to a "type of 
constitutional dialogue with the Court, through legislation, on mat-
ters of vital national concern." 
Beyond these, Agresta suggests in two modest paragraphs that 
there might be other congressional responses to judicial acts. With-
out elaboration or critical evaluation, he specifies Congress's powers 
under the fourteenth amendment: on the one hand, "for example, 
the long-neglected privileges and immunities clause"; and on the 
other, Congress's power "under the fifth section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 
Agresta's important contribution to the chronic and sometimes 
acute debate on constitutional democracy and judicial review is a 
matter of emphasis, not of detail. Agresta's objective is to restore a 
perspective easy to lose in preoccupation with detail. He does not 
attempt to be exhaustive, but instead hopes his work "can serve as a 
guide to the complexity of the problem and as a preface to further 
practical suggestions .... " The book proves to do this very well; 
and therefore to point out that further practical suggestions require 
more exacting scrutiny of certain points of history and of theory 
than his effort to shift attention and discussion from reconciliation 
to tension and checks, is not to denigrate Agresta's work. 
Consider, for example, the "more speculative and tenative 
means" he mentions for "framing congressional responses to judi-
cial acts." Too optimistically Agresta suggests: "It may well be that 
here, in the expansive powers purposely vested in Congress under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the best response to all instances of 
judicial over-extension may finally be found." The particular no-
tion to which Agresta here alludes-that Congress has "power 'to 
define the substantive scope of the Amendment' " is hopelessly fal-
lacious. The phrase which he quotes is from Justice Harlan's dis-
sent in Katzenbach v. Morgan, and does accurately summarize the 
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effect of the second rationale articulated in Justice Brennan's major-
ity opinion in that case.s But that rationale (although it carried the 
voting age statute through Congress) is incapable of surviving re-
flection.9 No Justice endorsed it in Oregon v. Mitchell, although 
Brennan attempted a deft revision.w Unanimously today the Jus-
tices deny any power in Congress to effect its own (in contrast to the 
Justices') understanding of the substantive scope of fourteenth 
amendment guarantees.! I (Some of them, indeed, are even disin-
clined to admit the full power supported by the Morgan case's valid 
first rationale-the analogy to the "necessary and proper" clause.l2 
The "substantive" rationale of Morgan would lack merit even if the 
Justices had not yet recognized its error. Its fault is the same that 
Agresta points out with respect to the contention of Jefferson, late 
in his life, that Congress is the exclusive oracle of the Constitution. 
That the judiciary must remain free to pursue its own construction 
of the Constitution, is a proposition which Agresta himself employs 
in explaining why amendment is ineffective as a check on the 
Supreme Court. 
Yet Agresta's failure in this detail should not discourage more 
creative theorizing in the general direction he points; there are via-
ble arguments capable of producing, in significant measure, "that 
vital continuing dialectic between judicial insight and democratic 
needs and desires" which he deems an effective check. 
For example, whether or not the Supreme Court is ready to 
acknowledge the error of the Slaughterhouse Cases and read more 
constitutional meaning into the "privileges or immunities" clause of 
the fourteenth amendment, that clause need not be confined to 
rights which have constitutional stature. The words "privileges" 
and "immunities" and equivalent terms of high-level generality 
were employed from Magna Carta beyond the Restoration, in colo-
8. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). The opinion's second, or "substantive," rationale is at 654-56; 
its first rationale (a valid analogy to the "necessary and proper" clause power) occupies 650-
53. 
9. The fallacy of that rationale, and the misapprehension of precedents relied upon by 
government counsel and several in academia to support it, were pointed out in this reviewer's 
article, Constitutionality of the Voting Age Statute, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I, 13-25 (1970), 
delivered to the Justices while Oregon v. Mitchell was pending. Morgan's first rationale, 
although valid, could give little support to the voting age statute; see id. at 8-12, 37-38. 
10. 400 U.S. 112, at 246-249 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, joined by White and Marshall, 
JJ.). 
II. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982). 
12. See, e.g., Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 
(1980), omitting from his accounting of "enforcement" clause theories the valid proposition 
(analogous to its power under the "necessary and proper" clause) that Congress can act 
prophylactically to prevent, as much as remedially to correct, violations of the "judicially 
established substantive prohibitions of the (various] amendments." /d. at 210. 
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nial charters and revolutionary documents, and in early state con-
stitutions, to embrace rights some of which rested on immemorial 
custom but some of which rose out of parliamentary legislation. It 
does not require Morgan's misconstruction of the "enforcement" 
clause to support statutory articulation of "privileges or immuni-
ties" which are not in themselves of constitutional stature.D 
Of course it would not require the fourteenth amendment to 
invalidate actual state abridgement of such statutory rights; for 
that, the "supremacy" clause is sufficient. But treating such statu-
tory rights as within the "privileges or immunities" clause would 
legitimate congressional measures designed to prevent possible 
abridgements before they occur (not merely to remedy those which 
in fact have occurred), by virtue of the "enforcement" clause as cor-
rectly expounded in the Morgan case's first rationale. This would 
mean that citizen rights based upon valid federal statutes are as 
much within Congress's broad protective power as rights constitu-
tionally derived. It would not allow Congress by statute to contra-
vene any interest which the judiciary found to warrant 
constitutional protection, and for this reason (as well as because one 
not deemed a "person" could hardly be deemed a "citizen") it 
might not allow Congress to override Roe v. Wade. In some other 
contexts, however, acknowledging statutory "privileges or immuni-
ties" as invoking Congress's enforcement power might at least dis-
courage attenuated judicial arguments. 
A more critical look at some other points of history and theory 
suggests another means within the reach of Congress to preserve a 
vigorous practice of judicial review while "preventing the power of 
constitutional interpretation from becoming the power to rule." At 
this point, however, this reviewer must ask the reader to contem-
plate certain ideas which might seem heretical. These ideas are only 
sketched here for the reader's consideration; but a brief resort to 
history might induce at least a suspension of disbelief. 
Contrary to an apparently universal misunderstanding, the 
1789 Judiciary Act did provide at least one federal forum where 
virtually every "federal question" then conceivable could be 
heard-either originally, by removal, or on writ of error. (The civil 
remedy customarily afforded private persons injured by others' vio-
lations of federal statutes, for example, was forfeiture, which was 
within the jurisdiction of the District Courts.) When the short-lived 
13. Certainly, without Morgan's "substantive" rationale some authority for congres· 
sional conferral of rights must be found consistent with the doctrine of enumerated powers; 
but a wide array of statutory rights can be conferred upon citizens as means to effectuate 
objectives constitutionally within the national government's enumerated powers, by virtue of 
the "necessary and proper" clause. 
1986] BOOK REVIEW 523 
1801 Act introduced the "general federal question" language-
which did not reappear until 1875-supporters and opponents of 
the 1801 measure alike noted that it added not a whit to the scope 
of jurisdiction statutorily conferred upon the federal judiciary as a 
whole. What distinguished the 1789 Judiciary Act was not any sub-
stantial shortfall in terms of subject matter jurisdiction, 14 but rather 
that it contemplated final adjudication of most federal court cases 
without opportunity for Supreme Court review. That no criminal 
case was reviewable is only the easiest of several examples; review-
ability in civil cases was exceptional as well. 
The original judicial structure thus did not conduce to uni-
formity of opinion even within the judicial branch; indeed, at the 
time of Marbury it was still rather common for circuit courts to 
disagree on constitutional as well as on numerous other legal ques-
tions. The first Congress had considered it more important in gen-
eral to facilitate final disposition of particular lawsuits than to 
ensure that the grounds of decision be uniform. That reflected the 
argument made by Madison in the Convention for leaving discre-
tion in Congress to establish more than one national court: several 
might be needed, he argued, "dispersed throughout the Republic 
withjinal jurisdiction in many cases," lest "appeals ... be multipled 
to a most oppressive degree .... "1s In 1802 and 1803, the original 
system was just beginning to be refashioned-and refashioned legis-
latively-into a pyramidic form; until then, in practice although not 
in name the original Virginia plan for the judiciary-that there be 
"one or more supreme tribunals"l(i__was in etfect.l7 
Suppose some modem Congress were emboldened selectively 
to follow the first Congress's lead. The consequence in the long run 
would most likely be such hegemony of sound reasoning and good 
sense as generally emerges from open debate and repeated reftec-
14. Marbury itself introduced the first substantial shortfall apart from the diversity "as-
signee" clause. Marshall reasoned for the Court that Marbury had a right to his commission; 
that the national government must afford him a remedy; and that the proper remedy was 
mandamus. Nonetheless the erroneous "mutually exclusive" view taken of Supreme Court 
original and appellate jurisdiction led him to hold unconstitutional the only provision that 
Congress had made for securing such relief. Because the requisite jurisdiction had not been 
vested in any other federal court by the 1789 Judiciary Act, Marbury actually contradicted its 
own premises by foreclosing all mandamus relief for unlawful behavior of non-judiciary offi· 
cials-thus opening the first significant fissure between the federal question jurisdiction con· 
templated by article III and that provided for by statute. Other events too complex to outline 
here subsequently enlarged the gap. 
15. I M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (Rev. 
ed. 1937) (Madison's notes) (emphasis in original). 
16. /d. at 21 (emphasis added). 
17. One therefore must not equate judicial review with Supreme Court review, as 
Agresto throughout his book tends to do. 
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tion. This could result on various "constitutional" points, just as it 
does on private law questions recurring among state appellate 
courts, from the exchange and reciprocal critique of opinions 
among federal courts of appeals (or, it could as well be, among dis-
trict courts).ts Any resulting uniformity on such points of constitu-
tional law then would have resulted from much wider (and perhaps 
wiser) deliberation induced by directive of the democratic organs, 
rather than from authoritarian imposition.t9 If there is to be an 
"institutionalized theoretician" in our polity, why should it not be 
the entire judiciary established pursuant to article III, instead of the 
one "supreme court" (whose appellate jurisidiction, after all, Con-
gress certainly may circumscribe)? Are the opportunities for sober 
reflection on our formative national ideals, the prospects of gui-
dance toward a principled political life, the hopes of bringing our 
philosophical principles to bear on our actions and working out the 
implications of our beliefs, not greater if we institutionalize public 
and scholarly debate over time with and among some score of such 
judges as Learned Hand, Henry Friendly, Skelly Wright, David 
Bazelon, John Gibbons, Richard Posner, Richard Arnold, Joseph 
Sneed, and Robert Bork, than if we ascribe special authority to a 
preeminent set of nine, no greater in talent, who so often disagree so 
sharply and by such narrow margins? If agreement were not ulti-
mately forthcoming from such a broadened array of the special ca-
pacities and talents which lawyers might bring to the task, would 
that not be reason to doubt that a particular point in controversy is 
18. Wisdom counsels against resting the final disposition of a constitutional question for 
purposes of any "case" in the hands of a single judge; the value of shared deliberation and 
risk of idiosyncratic judgment are too great. The first Congress, while it provided for "infer-
ior" court finality, respected this wisdom. Judgments of the single-judge district courts gen-
erally were reviewable by a multi-judge circuit court; and the circuit courts (where most cases 
other than in admiralty or for forfeiture were tried), while most of their judgments were 
unreviewable, originally sat with three judges. When Congress reduced the number of judges 
on circuit courts to two, and then made it permissible for even one judge to hold court alone, 
apprehensiveness over finality of disposition by a single judge added substantially to the pres-
sure for easing barriers to Supreme Court review, and hence to the pyramidization of the 
federal judicial structure. 
19. Uniformity in rules of decision is a moral ideal of justice which has carried great 
force from the beginning; and certainly it was one factor inducing Jefferson's Congress tardily 
to commence pyramidization of the federal courts. But uniformity of decision-even on con-
stitutional questions-is not a value of constitutional dimension. There are indeed questions, 
including many constitutional questions, the coexistence of different rulings on which is in-
consistent with the practical needs of government operation; but there are other constitu-
tional questions addressed by the modem Supreme Court of which that cannot be said. The 
Union would not be imperiled, for example, if school children prayed in the fourth circuit but 
not in the ninth, or if abortions were legal in the tenth circuit but not in the eighth, or if the 
exclusionary rule were applied in the second circuit but not in the fifth. On such questions, 
the text manifestly affording fair room for disagreement among intelligent, critical, and reflec-
tive minds, it is incompatible with the highest constitutional values to dictate uniformity 
while storms of controversy rage. 
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so clearly resolved in the collective mind of the nation that it should 
be called "constitutional" and removed from the realm of political 
debate? 
For any who share Dr. Agresta's concern for effective checks 
to prevent judicial review from operating to constitute the Supreme 
Court an undemocratic ruler, selective de-pyramidization of the 
federal judiciary is a practical, historically precedented, and clearly 
constitutional possibility worthy of serious thought. 
DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE. 
By Jerry L. Mashaw.1 New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press. 1985. Pp. xiv, 279. $24.00. 
Ronald A. Cass2 
The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments have for some time been among the deadliest foes of trees. 
Courts constantly write about these clauses, and numerous academ-
ics-chiefly professors of law, philosophy, or government-have of-
fered words of wisdom on the derivation, meaning, and role of due 
process. Due process is, indeed, the Constitution's clause celebre. 
It is hard to find much new to say about due process. It is hard 
even to find new ways to phrase old thoughts about due process, 
much less better ways. Authors who would add to the literature on 
due process must overcome a presumption that their messages are 
trite, trivial, or implausible. Jerry Mashaw's book clearly succeeds. 
There are many ways to write about due process. One can ap-
proach the subject historically, tracing the development and use of 
the concept from its appearance in the Magna Charta as the re-
quirement of action per legem terrae (by the law of the land). An-
other approach is doctrinal analysis, not just reporting the cases but 
evaluating the legal tests for due process against implicit or explicit 
criteria for legal decisionmaking. A third sort of inquiry is philo-
sophical, asking what process rules would be used in a good or just 
society. 
In some measure Mashaw's book may be classed as belonging 
to all of these genres, but none is a good fit. A better description of 
the book is an exploration of the due process field. Mashaw roams 
through case law and commentary, searching for arguments that 
I. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. 
2. Professor of Law, Boston University. Thanks to my colleague, Ira Lupu, for his 
helpful comments. 
